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WHOMEVER: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
APPROACH TO JUDGING
JOHN CONLEY†
Prior to the conference, the organizers asked me for my thoughts
on how an anthropologist might approach the problem of studying
judging. Those thoughts follow. I have subsequently reflected on the
discussion at the conference itself, and I conclude this essay with those
reflections.
When I think of “judging” as an anthropologist, I think of two of
the classics in legal anthropology: Paul Bohannan’s Justice and
Judgment Among the Tiv1 and Max Gluckman’s The Judicial Process
Among the Barotse.2 Both of these books were ethnographic studies of
African tribal courts during the latter days of British colonial rule. The
tribal judges were prominent in both books, and when I teach them in
law school I ask students to compare the tribal judges’ roles and
conduct to what they know about contemporary American judges.
Like American judges, these African judges sometimes maneuvered
the disputants into settlements and sometimes issued final judgments.
Unlike American judges, they never wrote opinions.3 So one could
understand them only by watching, listening, and attending to all
Copyright © 2018 John Conley.
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1. PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIV (Waveland Press, Inc.
1989) (1957).
2. MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA (ZAMBIA) (2d ed. 1973) (1955).
3. See id. at 250 (“{T}here is no written corpus of judicial precedents {among the
Barotse}.”); id. at 288 (noting that “the absence of written precedents . . . limits judicial logic”).
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aspects of their behavior, including such apparently trivial details as
how they arranged the seating in the open-air courtroom.
I also think—though far less grandiosely, of course—of the work
that Mack O’Barr and I did in American small claims courts in the
1980s and 1990s.4 Like their African counterparts, the judges we
watched in these courts persuaded, cajoled, threatened, and, when
necessary, judged. Nothing except the basic terms of a final judgment
got committed to writing. Moreover, again as in the African courts, the
small claims judges had broad and largely unreviewable authority to
impose whatever “law” they saw fit. In one memorable case that
involved a dry cleaner’s liability for a damaged suit, the judge decided
to await and abide by the ruling of that august supranational tribunal,
the International Fabricare Institute.
Regardless of any methodological preferences or preconceptions
we might have had, the absence of written work product forced us—as
it had forced Gluckman and Bohannan—to focus on the performance
aspects of judging. Exactly what did the judges say? Just how did they
say it? What was their non-verbal behavior like? And a good thing,
too: this enforced focus on behavior led us in directions we never would
have thought of on our own. We found a range of judging styles and
approaches; in anthropological terms, each courtroom had its own legal
culture, created by the judge. Within these mini-cultures, we found
curious echoes of such jurisprudential schools as formalism and
realism, as well as applications of the psychological concept of
procedural justice. This is not to say that the judges were consciously
enacting these theories, but enacting them they were.
This focus also led to another set of findings, all derived from an
initial observation that courtroom interactions are a form of
conversation. (This observation was influenced by an earlier study of
British courts, Max Atkinson and Paul Drew’s Order in Court.5)
Practitioners of various forms of “ethnomodology" (including
conversation analysts, linguistic anthropologists, and the many species
of discourse analysts) have long demonstrated that “doing”
conversation is an enormously complex social task, one that requires
detailed rules. Moreover, ethnomethodologists argue, these and other
things that we think of as social “rules" are not rules in the sense of
preexisting principles that need only to be applied. Rather, they are
4. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES V. RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990).
5. J. MAXWELL ATKINSON & PAUL DREW, ORDER IN COURT (1979).
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“phenomena of order,” apparent rules that people “attend to," and
that “emerge” over and over again as people negotiate concrete social
situations. For example, two separate discourse analyses of actual jury
deliberations (by Doug Maynard and John Manzo, in 1993,6 and Robin
Conley and me, this year7) have shown, respectively, how principles of
justice and standards of proof are produced by jurors in the course of
their conversations. In the small claims courtroom, O’Barr and I saw
emergent rules for such judging problems as displaying authority,
“doing” due process, showing empathy, and delivering bad news.
But why would these approaches have any relevance for those
who study “real” judges? In a current draft of a paper on the practical
impact of “landmark” decisions, Professors George, Gulati, and
McGinley8 suggest that the crowd divides into two general camps: the
legal scholars, who parse opinions; and the political scientists and their
allies, who count and otherwise slice and dice outcomes. Why might
either camp care about methods of studying judging developed while
sitting under a tree in Nigeria or in grimy small claims courts around
the United States?
Because “real” lawyers and their clients might care. The most
striking observation made by George et al. is that practicing lawyers
and judges as well as potentially affected citizens may not define
“landmark” in the same way as academics. In the case that George’s
group focused on, what the eggheads expected to be earth-shaking
barely registered on the ground.
This leads to a corollary idea more directly related to judging:
practicing lawyers may define “good” and “bad” judges in very
different ways than academics. Law professors tend to praise written
opinions that are logically tight, that deal appropriately with precedent,
and, most of all, that validate the professors’ policy preferences. The
authors of such opinions are “good” judges. Similarly, quantitative
studies tend to exalt judges who write lots of opinions (some
researchers prefer long ones and others short ones), who rarely get
reversed, and who get cited often.
6. Douglas W. Maynard. & John F. Manzo, On the Sociology of Justice: Theoretical Notes
from an Actual Jury Deliberation, 11 SOC. THEORY 171 (1993).
7. Robin H. Conley & John M. Conley, Stories from the Jury Room: How Jurors Use
Narrative to Process Evidence, 49 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 25 (2009).
8. Tracey George, Mitu Gulati & Ann McGinley, The (Relative) Unimportance of Case
Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Events/eveFile/The%20Relative%20Unimportance%20—
%20Gulati.pdf.
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But talk to practicing lawyers and you might get a different
emphasis. (I base this generalization on my own six years in full-time
practice and 26 as of counsel to a firm and student of the profession.)
First, reversing the priority of their status-conscious academic betters,
lawyers may focus more on trial than appellate judges because of per
capita impact on their practice. They are often more interested in how
law is administered in their cases than in what law is made in
“important” cases. Second, my guess is that practitioners would
identify a much higher proportion of “bad” judges. If, for instance, one
were to rely solely on the testimony of former law clerks now in
academia, all federal judges would emerge as hybrids of Oliver
Wendell Holmes and St. Thomas More. But practitioners see some of
these same judges as, in varying combinations, lazy, stupid, and mean
(to quote my brother, a practicing lawyer).
In identifying “good” judges, practicing lawyers are likely to ask
such questions as: How does s/he behave in court? Does s/he treat
lawyers, litigants, and witnesses fairly and courteously? Can s/he
manage a trial competently? Does s/he actually listen or does s/he
prejudge things? Will s/he decide motions in a reasonable period of
time, or does s/he ignore them in the hope they’ll go away? How smart
is s/he?
These judicial qualities, I suspect, are very important to those who
must live with the judges. But they do not necessarily emerge from
written opinions, nor from aggregations of outcomes. They would
become evident only through an inductive, ethnographic approach to
judging that paid particular attention to language. I wonder what other
“phenomena of order" might emerge. I suspect that important clues
to the legitimacy of the legal system might reside in the details of
courtroom interactions, and that a significant, “emergent” notion of
justice might reveal itself as well. The point is that, based on
anthropology’s experience, including my own, I would not know what
hypotheses to test a priori, but would instead expect the unexpected.
An aside: the legitimacy issue was brought home to me when I
made my first visit to the European Court of Justice this past summer.
With a group of students, I attended a hearing in a case about import
duties (a private company versus the European Commission). The
lawyers argued in German, the judges spoke in French (badly, since
none came from France), and I listened alternately in French and
English. The lawyers read prepared remarks and the judges asked no
questions; their only utterances were organizational and perfunctory
(“We’ll hear now from Herr X”). Instead, they stared with glazed
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eyes or flipped through the parties’ written submissions. I could not
imagine what value this presumably expensive exercise had for anyone
(except the private-sector lawyer, of course).
After the hearing I discussed it with an ECJ staff lawyer. I asked,
in more polite language, “Why bother with this charade?” I suggested
that the court learned nothing and the parties did nothing to advance
their cases that couldn't have been done better in writing. He didn’t
disagree, but said that hearings helped to legitimize the ECJ in the eyes
of litigants and, more broadly, to inculcate EU citizenship. I could not
imagine how. But I thought that if I had been paying closer attention—
paying ethnographic attention, as it were—and had a chance to study
and restudy my own, linguistic transcript of the hearing, I might have
been able to figure out how the court and its constituents were “doing”
legitimacy.
All of these considerations lead to the methodological question of
how an ethnographer would study “real” judges (federal district
judges, let’s say). One thought might be to collect trial transcripts of
cases that had been appealed and do discourse analysis. That would be
interesting. However, from a sociolinguistic perspective, that would be
more a study of transcripts than a study of judicial behavior. Court
reporters perform a subtle kind of interpretation, and their work
product is not what a linguist would call a transcript. Moreover, trial
transcripts miss much of what counts as judicial behavior, even in the
courtroom.
The only ethnographic solution would be to do what Bohannan
and Gluckman did in Africa, and O’Barr and I did in small claims court:
pick some judges, spend days or weeks in detailed observation of their
behavior in court (I can’t imagine getting into chambers), tape record
it all, and prepare and analyze the detailed, multi-dimensional
transcripts that discourse analysts use. In terms of permission, the
watching part would be easy, probably a matter of constitutional right
(meddling Institutional Review Boards be damned). The recording
part would require the permission of each judge. Based on previous
experience (in both small claims and, in graduate school, “big” court),
some would agree and some wouldn’t. All would insist on permission
from lawyers and litigants. Perhaps surprisingly, all that I encountered
agreed.
Again based on previous experience, it would be a long and
demanding project, but by no means undoable. As models, compare
not only my small claims work but Beth Mertz’s 2007 book, The
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Language of Law School,9 which analyzed discourse in several firstyear law school classes around the country (and, as I think about it, is
an excellent illustration of every point I’ve tried to make here). For
the reasons already advanced, I think such a project would be
eminently worthwhile, although probably in surprising ways. I doubt
I’ll do it, but I hope someone will.
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONFERENCE
Being an anthropologist, I approached the conference itself as an
ethnographic opportunity—I don’t know any better. It was another
day among the “natives,” in this case an array of federal and state
judges, trial and appellate, and some academics who are interested in
studying them. Two themes stood out.
The first was the sharp distinction between trial and appellate
judging. Trial judges engage in complex conversations. Many times
these conversations are live, oral, and public, as when a judge conducts
a trial, a motion argument, or a sentencing hearing. The judge must
not only apply the law in real time, but must also manage the human
interaction. Most trial judges realize that their job in an adversary
system is to stay as far in the background as possible while letting the
parties produce the trial. The lawyers are frequently repeat players
with whom the judge will have to deal again and again. This task—
“doing trial judging”—strikes me as remarkably challenging, both
intellectually and sociologically. And it must be done while looking
over one’s shoulder, since the whole performance is subject to public
review, (sometimes unfair) recharacterization, and (sometimes
withering) critique.
Appellate judges, by contrast, spend most of their time
manipulating written texts. As they described it at the conference,
their work consists largely of reading briefs, memos, cases, and statutes;
drafting, circulating, and reading opinions; and attempting to persuade
colleagues in written (and, increasingly, electronic) communications.
Live conversations in the form of oral arguments and conferences with
colleagues are the exception. With the exception of the oral
arguments, the work of appellate judges is done in privacy and relative
anonymity. When they do perform publicly, they—in contrast to their
trial colleagues—are expected to be the stars, interrupting and

9. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A
LAWYER” (2007).
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hectoring the lawyers with questions that sometimes seem intended to
show off as much as to focus the arguments.
These functional differences brought home to me the point that
studying judging encompasses two quite different projects. To study
the performance of trial judges is to study public behavior and public
documents. It is thus inherently doable, even if extraordinarily laborintensive. Appellate judges, however, do most of their work in a secret
world that is seemingly impenetrable to ethnographers or others who
rely on direct observation. One can study only the judgments and
opinions they are required to release to the public; the performance
that underlies these carefully crafted documents is immune to scrutiny.
The second observation derives from the first: judges have
difficulty being anything but judges, and the trial-appellate distinction
carried over into the conference discussion. The trial judges, by and
large, conversed. They asked and answered questions and seemed
eager to have external, scientific perspectives on what and how they
are doing. The appellate judges acted like, well, appellate judges (with
apologies to the exceptions). They monopolized the floor, interrupted,
and sometimes went on, and on, and on. There was nothing unpleasant
about this; on the contrary, the whole event was unfailingly cordial. It
was just that the appellate judges stayed in courtroom character. When
they discussed their behind-the-scenes work, they saw few problems
that were worth studying. They have things under control (aside from
the rare colleague who doesn’t work well with others and writes
gratuitous dissents). We academics will never get in, of course, but
what would be the point? (And academic idolatry of federal appellate
judges only eggs them on.)
So I came away from the conference with mixed feelings. Trial
judges want to be studied, and there are many ways to do it, with
ethnography well-positioned to play a role. But at the appellate level,
it seems that we will be limited to the analysis of outcomes. As it
usually does in legal scholarship, “empirical” will continue to mean
“quantitative.”

